isms. The naval factor can never ignore
the others. From the outset one or more of them will always call for some
act of exercising command which will not wait for its turn in the logical
progression. To a greater or less extent in all ordinary cases both
categories of operation will have to be put in motion from the beginning.
Hence the importance of realising the distinction between the two generic
forms of naval activity. In the hurry and stress of war confusion between
them is easy. By keeping a firm grip upon the difference we can see at
least what we are doing. We can judge how far any given operation that may
be called for is a sacrifice of security to exercise, how far such a
sacrifice may be justified, and how far the one end may be made to serve
the other. By applying the distinction as a test much error may be avoided.
The risk we take may be great, but we shall be able to weigh it accurately
against the value of the end, and we shall take it with our eyes open and
of set purpose. Above all, it will enable the Staff to settle clearly for
each squadronal commander what is to be his primary objective, and what the
object or purpose of the operations entrusted to him. It is above all in
this last consideration, and particularly in the determination of the
objective, that lies the main practical value of the distinction.
This will become clear the moment we begin to consider defence against
invasion, which naturally takes the first place amongst operations for the
exercise of control. Of all the current assumptions, not one is so
confusing for the finer adjustments of strategy as that which affirms that
the primary objective of our fleet is always the enemy's fleet. Of the
battle-fleet and its attendant units it is of course true, so long at least
as the enemy has a battle-fleet in being. It is true, that is, of all
operations for securing control, but of operations for exercising control
it is not true. In the case we have now to consider-defence against
invasion-the objective of the special operations is, and always has been,
the enemy's army. On this fundamental postulate our plans for resisting
invasion have always been constructed from the year of the Armada to 1805.
In the old service tradition the point was perfectly well established.
Admirals' instructions constantly insist on the fact that the transports
are the "principal object." The whole disposition of the fleet during
Hawke's blockade in 1759 was
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