pon any advantage of the
wind give battle to the enemy than retreat farther than is necessary to get
an advantage upon the enemy." It was, however, left to his discretion to
proceed to the westward to complete his concentration that way, provided,
it said, "you by no means ever lose sight of the French fleet whereby they
may have opportunity of making attempts upon the shore or in the rivers of
Medway or Thames, or get away without fighting."
This order has been very hardly dealt with by modern critics, although it
clearly contemplates true preventive observation, and even, as the last
words suggest, the idea contained in Nelson's well-known saying, "that by
the time the enemy had beat our fleet soundly they would do us no more harm
this year." It is true that Nelson could rely on the proved superiority of
the British at that time unit for unit, but it is also true that Nottingham
and his colleagues in the Government had information which led them greatly
to underestimate Tourville's strength. This was evident on the face of
Nottingham's despatch which covered the order, so evident indeed that
Torrington might well perhaps have suspended the execution of an order so
obviously based on incorrect information. But knowing probably what
intrigues were going on against him at Court, he chose to regard it as a
peremptory command to engage whenever he found himself to windward.
Much as a more scientific view of naval strategy may admire Torrington's
conception, there seems no reason for losing temper over the Government's
plan. It was certainly one way of solving the problem, and seeing how large
were our reserves, a defeat need not have meant disaster. Still, it was
doubtless dictated by an inability to grasp, the strategical strength of
Torrington's novel plan, a plan which was not only safer, but was
calculated to achieve greater positive results in the end. The real fallacy
of the Government's plan was that although it had a specious appearance of
a bold offensive, it could have achieved nothing but a negative result. The
most a battle could have given in the circumstances could only have left
the command in dispute, and the worst would have given the enemy a positive
result, which must have gravely compromised William's campaign in Ireland.
On these lines Torrington replied to the Government. Dealing with their
anxiety for the ships to the westward and the Mediterranean convoy, whose
danger was their expressed reason f
|