achieve less and less, till in the eighteenth century it was regarded as
almost negligible. Even its moral effect was lost, and it ceased to be
considered as a battle unit.

Now, if we examine closely the Port Arthur case, we shall find it pointing
to the existence of certain inherent conditions not dissimilar from those
which discredited fireships as a decisive factor in war. In spite of the
apparently formidable nature of a surprise attack by torpedo the
indications from the one case in point are that these conditions make for
greater power in the defence than in the attack. The first condition
relates to the difficulty of locating the objective accurately. It is
obvious that for this kind of operation the most precise intelligence is
essential, and of all intelligence the most difficult to obtain in war is
the distribution of an enemy's fleet from day to day. The Japanese had
fairly certain information that the bulk of the Port Arthur squadron was
lying in the outer anchorage, but it had been constantly moving, and there
was a report that three battleships had just been detached from it. The
report was false, but the result was that of the five divisions of
destroyers which the Japanese had available, two were diverted against
Dalny, where no enemy was found. Such uncertainty must always exist, and in
no circumstances is it likely to be less than where, as in the Japanese
case, the attack is made before declaration, and while the ordinary
channels of intelligence are still open.

Further, it is to be noted that in spite of the fact that relations for
some weeks had been highly strained, and a surprise torpedo attack was
regarded as probable, the Russians had taken no precautions to confuse
their enemy. It is obvious that measures to prevent accurate locating can,
and should, be taken in such cases. We may go further. From confusing the
enemy by such means it is but a step to lead him to a wrong conclusion, and
to lay for him a trap which may swallow up the bulk of his destroyer force
in the first hours of the war. It is to be feared, however, that the risks
of such an eventuality are so great in minor counter-attacks of this
nature, that it will probably be very difficult to tempt an inferior enemy
to expose his flotilla in this way.

This view receives emphasis from the second point which the Port Arthur
case serves to demonstrate, and that is the great power of even the
flimsiest defence against such attacks; in