Channel without giving the British admiral a chance of contact. His method,
however, differed from that of Torrington, and he only achieved his
negative object by keeping out of sight of his enemy altogether. In his
opinion, if a fleet remained at sea in close observation of an active enemy
an action could not be avoided. "If (the admiral)," he wrote in his
memorandum on the subject, "be ordered to keep the sea to try to amuse the
enemy and to let them know we are in a position to attack in case they
attempt a descent, I think it my duty to say that in that case we must make
up our mind to have to fight them in the end; for if they have really
sought an action, they will have been able to fight, seeing that it is
impossible to pirouette so long near a fleet without coming to grips."[20]
This is as much as to say that a sure point of temporary retreat is
necessary to "a fleet in being," and this was an essential part of
Torrington's idea.
[20] Delarbre, _Tourville et la marine de son temps_, p. 339. (Author's
note.)
In Torrington's and Tourville's time, when ships were unhandy and fleet
tactics in their infancy, the difficulty of avoiding action, when a
determined enemy had once got contact, were undoubtedly great, unless a
port of retreat was kept open. But as the art of naval warfare developed,
the possibilities of "a fleet in being" were regarded as much wider, at
least in the British service. It was nearly a hundred years before we were
again forced to use the same device on a large scale, and then it was
believed that superior speed and tactical precision were factors that could
be counted on to an almost unlimited extent. In the darkest days of the War
of American Independence we have a memorandum of the subject by Kempenfelt,
which not only gives the developed idea of "a fleet in being" and the high
aggressive spirit that is its essence, but also explains its value, not
merely as a defensive expedient, but as a means of permitting a drastic
offensive even when you are as a whole inferior. "When you know the enemy's
designs," he says, "in order to do something effectual you must endeavour
to be superior to them in some part where they have designs to execute, and
where, if they succeed, they would most injure you. If your fleet is
divided as to be in all places inferior to the enemy, they will have a fair
chance of succeeding everywhere in their attempts. If a squadron cannot be
formed sufficient to face th
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