ith the situation.
"As I think it," he said, "of the greatest consequence to his Majesty's
service to prevent the landing of these troops in any part of the country,
I have ... determined to anchor without the sands of Dunkirk, where we
shall be in the fairest way for keeping them in." That is, he determined to
keep hold of the army regardless of the enemy's fleet, and as Saxe's
objective was not quite certain, he would do it by close blockade. "But
if," he continued, "they should unfortunately get out and pass in the night
and go northward [that is, for Scotland], I intend to detach a superior
force to endeavour to overtake and destroy them, and with the remainder of
my squadron either fight the French fleet now in the Channel, or observe
them and cover the country as our circumstances will admit of; or I shall
pursue the embarkation [that is, follow the transports] with all my
strength." This meant he would treat the enemy's army offensively and their
fleet defensively, and his plan was entirely approved by the King.
As to which of the two plans he would adopt, the inference is that his
choice would depend on the strength of the enemy, for it was reported the
Rochefort squadron had joined Roquefeuille. The doubt was quickly settled.
On the morrow he heard that Roquefeuille was at Dungeness with only fifteen
of the line. In a moment he seized all the advantage of the interior
position which Roquefeuille's necessity to close on the army had given him.
With admirable insight he saw there was time to fling his whole force at
the enemy's fleet without losing his hold on the army's line of passage.
The movement was made immediately. The moment the French were sighted
"General chase" was signalled, and Roquefeuille was within an ace of being
surprised at his anchorage when a calm stopped the attack. The calm was
succeeded by another furious gale, in which the French escaped in a
disastrous _sauve qui peut_, and the fleet of transports was destroyed. The
outcome of it all was not only the failure of the invasion, but that we
secured the command of home waters for the rest of the war.
The whole attempt, it will be seen, with everything in its favour, had
exhibited the normal course of degradation. For all the nicely framed plan
and the perfect deception, the inherent difficulties, when it came to the
point of execution, had as usual forced a clumsy concentration of the
enemy's battle-fleet with his transports, and we on our
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