lterior
object will always obtrude itself. We must from the first do our best to
control sea communications, and since those communications are usually
common, we cannot refrain from occupying those of the enemy without at the
same time neglecting and exposing our own. Thus in the case of Brest a
close blockade was always desirable, and especially at convoy seasons,
because the great trade routes which passed within striking distance of the
port were all common, whereas in the region of Toulon the main lines were
not common except along the coasts of Africa and Southern Italy, and these
Nelson's open blockade amply secured.

The general conclusion, then, is that however high may be the purely naval
and strategical reasons for adopting open blockade as the best means of
securing a decision against the enemy's fleet, yet the inevitable intrusion
of the ulterior object in the form of trade protection or the security of
military expeditions will seldom leave us entirely free to use the open
method. We must be prepared, in fact, to find ourselves at least at times
faced with the necessity of using a form of blockade as nearly modelled on
the old close blockade as changed conditions will permit.

* * * * *

CHAPTER THREE

METHODS OF DISPUTING COMMAND

* * * * *

I. DEFENSIVE FLEET OPERATIONS--"A FLEET IN BEING"

In dealing with the theory of sea command, attention was called to the
error of assuming that if we are unable to win the command we therefore
lose it. It was pointed out that this proposition, which is too often
implied in strategical discussion, denies in effect that there can be such
a thing as strategical defensive at sea, and ignores the fact that the
normal condition in war is for the command to be in dispute. Theory and
history are at one on the point. Together they affirm that a Power too weak
to win command by offensive operations may yet succeed in holding the
command in dispute by assuming a general defensive attitude.

That such an attitude in itself cannot lead to any positive result at sea
goes without saying, but nevertheless even over prolonged periods it can
prevent an enemy securing positive results, and so give time for the other
belligerent to dominate the situation by securing his ends ashore.

It is seldom that we have been forced even for a time to adopt such an
attitude, but our enemies have done s