our fellow-
creatures; it will be necessary to _inquire what respect benevolence hath
to self-love_, _and the pursuit of private interest to the pursuit of
public_: or whether there be anything of that peculiar inconsistence and
contrariety between them over and above what there is between self-love
and other passions and particular affections, and their respective
pursuits.
These inquiries, it is hoped, may be favourably attended to; for there
shall be all possible concessions made to the favourite passion, which
hath so much allowed to it, and whose cause is so universally pleaded: it
shall be treated with the utmost tenderness and concern for its
interests.
In order to do this, as well as to determine the forementioned questions,
it will be necessary to _consider the nature_, _the object_, _and end of
that self-love_, _as distinguished from other principles or affections in
the mind_, _and their respective objects_.
Every man hath a general desire of his own happiness; and likewise a
variety of particular affections, passions, and appetites to particular
external objects. The former proceeds from, or is, self-love; and seems
inseparable from all sensible creatures, who can reflect upon themselves
and their own interest or happiness so as to have that interest an object
to their minds; what is to be said of the latter is, that they proceed
from or together make up that particular nature, according to which man
is made. The object the former pursues is somewhat internal--our own
happiness, enjoyment, satisfaction; whether we have, or have not, a
distinct particular perception what it is, or wherein it consists: the
objects of the latter are this or that particular external thing, which
the affections tend towards, and of which it hath always a particular
idea or perception. The principle we call self-love never seeks anything
external for the sake of the thing, but only as a means of happiness or
good: particular affections rest in the external things themselves. One
belongs to man as a reasonable creature reflecting upon his own interest
or happiness. The other, though quite distinct from reason, are as much
a part of human nature.
That all particular appetites and passions are towards _external things
themselves_, distinct from the _pleasure arising from them_, is
manifested from hence; that there could not be this pleasure, were it not
for that prior suitableness between the object and the passion: the
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