in reality that passion does no more account for the
whole appearances of good-will than this appetite does. Is there not
often the appearance of one man's wishing that good to another, which he
knows himself unable to procure him; and rejoicing in it, though bestowed
by a third person? And can love of power any way possibly come in to
account for this desire or delight? Is there not often the appearance of
men's distinguishing between two or more persons, preferring one before
another, to do good to, in cases where love of power cannot in the least
account for the distinction and preference? For this principle can no
otherwise distinguish between objects than as it is a greater instance
and exertion of power to do good to one rather than to another. Again,
suppose good-will in the mind of man to be nothing but delight in the
exercise of power: men might indeed be restrained by distant and
accidental consideration; but these restraints being removed, they would
have a disposition to, and delight in, mischief as an exercise and proof
of power: and this disposition and delight would arise from, or be the
same principle in the mind, as a disposition to and delight in charity.
Thus cruelty, as distinct from envy and resentment, would be exactly the
same in the mind of man as good-will: that one tends to the happiness,
the other to the misery, of our fellow-creatures, is, it seems, merely an
accidental circumstance, which the mind has not the least regard to.
These are the absurdities which even men of capacity run into when they
have occasion to belie their nature, and will perversely disclaim that
image of God which was originally stamped upon it, the traces of which,
however faint, are plainly discernible upon the mind of man.

If any person can in earnest doubt whether there be such a thing as good-
will in one man towards another (for the question is not concerning
either the degree or extensiveness of it, but concerning the affection
itself), let it be observed that _whether man be thus_, _or otherwise
constituted_, _what is the inward frame in this particular_ is a mere
question of fact of natural history not provable immediately by reason.
It is therefore to be judged of and determined in the same way other
facts or matters of natural history are--by appealing to the external
senses, or inward perceptions respectively, as the matter under
consideration is cognisable by one or the other: by arguing from
acknowledg