s
proceed from one and some from the other will be manifest to any who will
observe the two following very supposable cases. One man rushes upon
certain ruin for the gratification of a present desire: nobody will call
the principle of this action self-love. Suppose another man to go
through some laborious work upon promise of a great reward, without any
distinct knowledge what the reward will be: this course of action cannot
be ascribed to any particular passion. The former of these actions is
plainly to be imputed to some particular passion or affection; the latter
as plainly to the general affection or principle of self-love. That
there are some particular pursuits or actions concerning which we cannot
determine how far they are owing to one, and how far to the other,
proceeds from this, that the two principles are frequently mixed
together, and run up into each other. This distinction is further
explained in the Eleventh Sermon.

{4} If any desire to see this distinction and comparison made in a
particular instance, the appetite and passion now mentioned may serve for
one. Hunger is to be considered as a private appetite, because the end
for which it was given us is the preservation of the individual. Desire
of esteem is a public passion; because the end for which it was given us
is to regulate our behaviour towards society. The respect which this has
to private good is as remote as the respect that has to public good; and
the appetite is no more self-love than the passion is benevolence. The
object and end of the former is merely food; the object and end of the
latter is merely esteem; but the latter can no more be gratified without
contributing to the good of society, than the former can be gratified
without contributing to the preservation of the individual.

{5} Emulation is merely the desire and hope of equality with or
superiority over others with whom we compare ourselves. There does not
appear to be any other _grief_ in the natural passion, but only _that
want_ which is implied in desire. However, this may be so strong as to
be the occasion of great _grief_. To desire the attainment of this
equality or superiority by the _particular means_ of others being brought
down to our own level, or below it, is, I think, the distinct notion of
envy. From whence it is easy to see that the real end, which the natural
passion emulation, and which the unlawful one envy aims at, is exactly
the same; namely,