of action. It were ridiculous to
assert that a man upon reflection hath the same kind of approbation of
the appetite of hunger or the passion of fear as he hath of goodwill to
his fellow-creatures. To be a just, a good, a righteous man, plainly
carries with it a peculiar affection to or love of justice, goodness,
righteousness, when these principles are the objects of contemplation.

Now if a man approves of, or hath an affection to, any principle in and
for itself, incidental things allowed for, it will be the same whether he
views it in his own mind or in another; in himself or in his neighbour.
This is the account of our approbation of, or moral love and affection to
good characters; which cannot but be in those who have any degrees of
real goodness in themselves, and who discern and take notice of the same
principle in others.

From observation of what passes within ourselves, our own actions, and
the behaviour of others, the mind may carry on its reflections as far as
it pleases; much beyond what we experience in ourselves, or discern in
our fellow creatures. It may go on and consider goodness as become a
uniform continued principle of action, as conducted by reason, and
forming a temper and character absolutely good and perfect, which is in a
higher sense excellent, and proportionably the object of love and
approbation.

Let us then suppose a creature perfect according to his created
nature--let his form be human, and his capacities no more than equal to
those of the chief of men--goodness shall be his proper character, with
wisdom to direct it, and power within some certain determined sphere of
action to exert it: but goodness must be the simple actuating principle
within him; this being the moral quality which is amiable, or the
immediate object of love as distinct from other affections of
approbation. Here then is a finite object for our mind to tend towards,
to exercise itself upon: a creature, perfect according to his capacity,
fixed, steady, equally unmoved by weak pity or more weak fury and
resentment; forming the justest scheme of conduct; going on undisturbed
in the execution of it, through the several methods of severity and
reward, towards his end, namely, the general happiness of all with whom
he hath to do, as in itself right and valuable. This character, though
uniform in itself, in its principle, yet exerting itself in different
ways, or considered in different views, may by its appearing var