pon himself and his own
condition of being. He would immediately feel that he was by no means
complete of himself, but totally insufficient for his own happiness. One
may venture to affirm that every man hath felt this, whether he hath
again reflected upon it or not. It is feeling this deficiency, that they
are unsatisfied with themselves, which makes men look out for assistance
from abroad, and which has given rise to various kinds of amusements,
altogether needless any otherwise than as they serve to fill up the blank
spaces of time, and so hinder their feeling this deficiency, and being
uneasy with themselves. Now, if these external things we take up with
were really an adequate supply to this deficiency of human nature, if by
their means our capacities and desires were all satisfied and filled up,
then it might be truly said that we had found out the proper happiness of
man, and so might sit down satisfied, and be at rest in the enjoyment of
it. But if it appears that the amusements which men usually pass their
time in are so far from coming up to or answering our notions and desires
of happiness or good that they are really no more than what they are
commonly called, somewhat to pass away the time, _i.e._ somewhat which
serves to turn us aside from, and prevent our attending to, this our
internal poverty and want; if they serve only, or chiefly, to suspend
instead of satisfying our conceptions and desires of happiness; if the
want remains, and we have found out little more than barely the means of
making it less sensible; then are we still to seek for somewhat to be an
adequate supply to it. It is plain that there is a capacity in the
nature of man which neither riches nor honours nor sensual
gratifications, nor anything in this world, can perfectly fill up or
satisfy: there is a deeper and more essential want than any of these
things can be the supply of. Yet surely there is a possibility of
somewhat which may fill up all our capacities of happiness, somewhat in
which our souls may find rest, somewhat which may be to us that
satisfactory good we are inquiring after. But it cannot be anything
which is valuable only as it tends to some further end. Those therefore
who have got this world so much into their hearts as not to be able to
consider happiness as consisting in anything but property and
possessions--which are only valuable as the means to somewhat else--cannot
have the least glimpse of the subject bef
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