stores of
knowledge, or anything beyond the present time; here is an instance of an
affection absolutely resting in its object as its end, and being
gratified in the same way as the appetite of hunger is satisfied with
food. Yet nothing is more common than to hear it asked, what advantage a
man hath in such a course, suppose of study, particular friendships, or
in any other; nothing, I say, is more common than to hear such a question
put in a way which supposes no gain, advantage, or interest, but as a
means to somewhat further: and if so, then there is no such thing at all
as real interest, gain, or advantage. This is the same absurdity with
respect to life as an infinite series of effects without a cause is in
speculation. The gain, advantage, or interest consists in the delight
itself, arising from such a faculty's having its object: neither is there
any such thing as happiness or enjoyment but what arises from hence. The
pleasures of hope and of reflection are not exceptions: the former being
only this happiness anticipated; the latter the same happiness enjoyed
over again after its time. And even the general expectation of future
happiness can afford satisfaction only as it is a present object to the
principle of self-love.

It was doubtless intended that life should be very much a pursuit to the
gross of mankind. But this is carried so much further than is reasonable
that what gives immediate satisfaction, _i.e._ our present interest, is
scarce considered as our interest at all. It is inventions which have
only a remote tendency towards enjoyment, perhaps but a remote tendency
towards gaining the means only of enjoyment, which are chiefly spoken of
as useful to the world. And though this way of thinking were just with
respect to the imperfect state we are now in, where we know so little of
satisfaction without satiety, yet it must be guarded against when we are
considering the happiness of a state of perfection; which happiness being
enjoyment and not hope, must necessarily consist in this, that our
affections have their objects, and rest in those objects as an end,
_i.e._ be satisfied with them. This will further appear in the sequel of
this discourse.

Of the several affections, or inward sensations, which particular objects
excite in man, there are some, the having of which implies the love of
them, when they are reflected upon. {29} This cannot be said of all our
affections, principles, and motives