re the distinctions which serve for a supply to it, some or
other of which have obtained in all ages and countries, one who is thus
friendly to his kind will immediately make due allowances for it, as what
cannot but be amongst such creatures as men, in such a world as this. And
as wrath and fury and overbearing upon these occasions proceed, as I may
speak, from men's feeling only on their own side, so a common feeling,
for others as well as for ourselves, would render us sensible to this
truth, which it is strange can have so little influence, that we
ourselves differ from others, just as much as they do from us. I put the
matter in this way, because it can scarce be expected that the generality
of men should see that those things which are made the occasions of
dissension and fomenting the party-spirit are really nothing at all: but
it may be expected from all people, how much soever they are in earnest
about their respective peculiarities, that humanity and common goodwill
to their fellow-creatures should moderate and restrain that wretched
spirit.
This good temper of charity likewise would prevent strife and enmity
arising from other occasions: it would prevent our giving just cause of
offence, and our taking it without cause. And in cases of real injury, a
good man will make all the allowances which are to be made, and, without
any attempts of retaliation, he will only consult his own and other men's
security for the future against injustice and wrong.
IV. I proceed to consider, lastly, what is affirmed of the precept now
explained, that it comprehends in it all others, _i.e._, that to love our
neighbour as ourselves includes in it all virtues.
Now the way in which every maxim of conduct, or general speculative
assertion, when it is to be explained at large should be treated, is, to
show what are the particular truths which were designed to be
comprehended under such a general observation, how far it is strictly
true, and then the limitations, restrictions, and exceptions, if there be
exceptions, with which it is to be understood. But it is only the former
of these, namely, how far the assertion in the text holds, and the ground
of the pre-eminence assigned to the precept of it, which in strictness
comes into our present consideration.
However, in almost everything that is said, there is somewhat to be
understood beyond what is explicitly laid down, and which we of course
supply, somewhat, I mean, which
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