would not be commonly called a
restriction or limitation. Thus, when benevolence is said to be the sum
of virtue, it is not spoken of as a blind propension, but a principle in
reasonable creatures, and so to be directed by their reason, for reason
and reflection comes into our notion of a moral agent. And that will
lead us to consider distant consequences, as well as the immediate
tendency of an action. It will teach us that the care of some persons,
suppose children and families, is particularly committed to our charge by
Nature and Providence, as also that there are other circumstances,
suppose friendship or former obligations, which require that we do good
to some, preferably to others. Reason, considered merely as subservient
to benevolence, as assisting to produce the greatest good, will teach us
to have particular regard to these relations and circumstances, because
it is plainly for the good of the world that they should be regarded. And
as there are numberless cases in which, notwithstanding appearances, we
are not competent judges, whether a particular action will upon the whole
do good or harm, reason in the same way will teach us to be cautious how
we act in these cases of uncertainty. It will suggest to our
consideration which is the safer side; how liable we are to be led wrong
by passion and private interest; and what regard is due to laws, and the
judgment of mankind. All these things must come into consideration, were
it only in order to determine which way of acting is likely to produce
the greatest good. Thus, upon supposition that it were in the strictest
sense true, without limitation, that benevolence includes in it all
virtues, yet reason must come in as its guide and director, in order to
attain its own end, the end of benevolence, the greatest public good.
Reason, then, being thus included, let us now consider the truth of the
assertion itself.

First, It is manifest that nothing can be of consequence to mankind or
any creature but happiness. This, then, is all which any person can, in
strictness of speaking, be said to have a right to. We can therefore
_owe no man anything_, but only to farther and promote his happiness,
according to our abilities. And therefore a disposition and endeavour to
do good to all with whom we have to do, in the degree and manner which
the different relations we stand in to them require, is a discharge of
all the obligations we are under to them.

As human