nature is not one simple uniform thing but a composition of
various parts, body, spirit, appetites, particular passions, and
affections, for each of which reasonable self-love would lead men to have
due regard, and make suitable provision, so society consists of various
parts to which we stand in different respects and relations, and just
benevolence would as surely lead us to have due regard to each of these
and behave as the respective relations require. Reasonable goodwill and
right behaviour towards our fellow-creatures are in a manner the same,
only that the former expresseth the principle as it is in the mind; the
latter, the principle as it were become external, _i.e._, exerted in
actions.
And so far as temperance, sobriety, and moderation in sensual pleasures,
and the contrary vices, have any respect to our fellow-creatures, any
influence upon their quiet, welfare, and happiness, as they always have a
real, and often a near influence upon it, so far it is manifest those
virtues may be produced by the love of our neighbour, and that the
contrary vices would be prevented by it. Indeed, if men's regard to
themselves will not restrain them from excess, it may be thought little
probable that their love to others will be sufficient: but the reason is,
that their love to others is not, any more than their regard to
themselves, just, and in its due degree. There are, however, manifest
instances of persons kept sober and temperate from regard to their
affairs, and the welfare of those who depend upon them. And it is
obvious to every one that habitual excess, a dissolute course of life,
implies a general neglect of the duties we owe towards our friends, our
families, and our country.
From hence it is manifest that the common virtues and the common vices of
mankind may be traced up to benevolence, or the want of it. And this
entitles the precept, _Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself_, to the
pre-eminence given to it, and is a justification of the apostle's
assertion, that all other commandments are comprehended in it, whatever
cautions and restrictions {28} there are, which might require to be
considered, if we were to state particularly and at length what is virtue
and right behaviour in mankind. But,
Secondly, It might be added, that in a higher and more general way of
consideration, leaving out the particular nature of creatures, and the
particular circumstances in which they are placed, benevolence see
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