eme as to run
insensibly and of course into the contrary; and that a doctrine's having
been a shelter for enthusiasm, or made to serve the purposes of
superstition, is no proof of the falsity of it: truth or right being
somewhat real in itself, and so not to be judged of by its liableness to
abuse, or by its supposed distance from or nearness to error. It may be
sufficient to have mentioned this in general, without taking notice of
the particular extravagances which have been vented under the pretence or
endeavour of explaining the love of God; or how manifestly we are got
into the contrary extreme, under the notion of a reasonable religion; so
very reasonable as to have nothing to do with the heart and affections,
if these words signify anything but the faculty by which we discern
speculative truth.
By the love of God I would understand all those regards, all those
affections of mind which are due immediately to Him from such a creature
as man, and which rest in Him as their end. As this does not include
servile fear, so neither will any other regards, how reasonable soever,
which respect anything out of or besides the perfection of the Divine
nature, come into consideration here. But all fear is not excluded,
because His displeasure is itself the natural proper object of fear.
Reverence, ambition of His love and approbation, delight in the hope or
consciousness of it, come likewise into this definition of the love of
God, because He is the natural object of all those affections or
movements of mind as really as He is the object of the affection, which
is in the strictest sense called love; and all of them equally rest in
Him as their end. And they may all be understood to be implied in these
words of our Saviour, without putting any force upon them: for He is
speaking of the love of God and our neighbour as containing the whole of
piety and virtue.
It is plain that the nature of man is so constituted as to feel certain
affections upon the sight or contemplation of certain objects. Now the
very notion of affection implies resting in its object as an end. And
the particular affection to good characters, reverence and moral love of
them, is natural to all those who have any degree of real goodness in
themselves. This will be illustrated by the description of a perfect
character in a creature; and by considering the manner in which a good
man in his presence would be affected towards such a character. He would
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