er they
are said to be one or the other. Therefore to those who are shocked to
hear virtue spoken of as disinterested, it may be allowed that it is
indeed absurd to speak thus of it; unless hatred, several particular
instances of vice, and all the common affections and aversions in
mankind, are acknowledged to be disinterested too. Is there any less
inconsistence between the love of inanimate things, or of creatures
merely sensitive, and self-love, than between self-love and the love of
our neighbour? Is desire of and delight in the happiness of another any
more a diminution of self-love than desire of and delight in the esteem
of another? They are both equally desire of and delight in somewhat
external to ourselves; either both or neither are so. The object of self-
love is expressed in the term self; and every appetite of sense, and
every particular affection of the heart, are equally interested or
disinterested, because the objects of them all are equally self or
somewhat else. Whatever ridicule therefore the mention of a
disinterested principle or action may be supposed to lie open to, must,
upon the matter being thus stated, relate to ambition, and every appetite
and particular affection as much as to benevolence. And indeed all the
ridicule, and all the grave perplexity, of which this subject hath had
its full share, is merely from words. The most intelligible way of
speaking of it seems to be this: that self-love and the actions done in
consequence of it (for these will presently appear to be the same as to
this question) are interested; that particular affections towards
external objects, and the actions done in consequence of those affections
are not so. But every one is at liberty to use words as he pleases. All
that is here insisted upon is that ambition, revenge, benevolence, all
particular passions whatever, and the actions they produce, are equally
interested or disinterested.

Thus it appears that there is no peculiar contrariety between self-love
and benevolence; no greater competition between these than between any
other particular affections and self-love. This relates to the
affections themselves. Let us now see whether there be any peculiar
contrariety between the respective courses of life which these affections
lead to; whether there be any greater competition between the pursuit of
private and of public good, than between any other particular pursuits
and that of private good.

There