nce recognised that he too
was an amateur, that it was impossible for one man to combine
effectively in his own person the duties of Head of the Government
and of Commander-in-Chief, he would have handed over the management
of his huge armies, and the direction of all military movements, to
the most capable soldier the Confederacy could produce. Capable
soldiers were not wanting; and had the control of military operations
been frankly committed to a trained strategist, and the military
resources of the Southern States been placed unreservedly at the
disposal of either Lee or Johnston, combined operations would have
taken the place of disjointed enterprises, and the full strength of
the country have been concentrated at the decisive point. It can
hardly, however, be imputed as a fault to Mr. Davis that he did not
anticipate a system which achieved such astonishing success in
Prussia's campaigns of '66 and '70. It was not through vanity alone
that he retained in his own hands the supreme control of military
affairs. The Confederate system of government was but an imitation of
that which existed in the United States; and in Washington, as in
Richmond, the President was not only Commander-in-Chief in name, but
the arbiter on all questions of strategy and organisation; while, to
go still further back, the English Cabinet had exercised the same
power since Parliament became supreme. The American people may be
forgiven for their failure to recognise the deplorable results of the
system they had inherited from the mother-country. The English people
had been equally blind, and in their case there was no excuse. The
mismanagement of the national resources in the war with France was
condoned by the victories of Wellington. The vicious conceptions of
the Government, responsible for so many useless enterprises, for
waste of life, of treasure, of opportunity, were lost in the blaze of
triumph in which the struggle ended. Forty years later it had been
forgotten that the Cabinet of 1815 had done its best to lose the
battle of Waterloo; the lessons of the great war were disregarded,
and the Cabinet of 1853 to 1854 was allowed to work its will on the
army of the Crimea.

It is a significant fact that, during the War of Secession, for the
three years the control of the armies of the North remained in the
hands of the Cabinet the balance of success lay with the
Confederates. But in March 1864 Grant was appointed
Commander-in-Chief; Linco