of the Army having been forced to
retire after a fierce engagement lasting five or six hours on August
18th, and the Commander of the Division having stated that his troops
were not in a fit state to withstand a long engagement owing to the
loss of officers and the weariness of the men; and, moreover, as the
Commander of the 3rd Division of the Army, which was so sorely tried
at Liege, had similarly come to the conclusion, on August 19th, that
the defence of the Dyle was becoming very dangerous, more especially
in view of the turning movement of the 2nd Army Corps and 2nd Cavalry
Division, it was definitely decided to retreat under the protection of
the forts at Antwerp.

"The general idea is now that the Field Army, in part or as a whole,
should issue from Antwerp as soon as circumstances seem to favour such
a movement.

"In this event, the Army will try to co-operate in its movements with
the Allies as circumstances may dictate."

Exhaustive reconnaissances and intelligence reports admitted of no
doubt that the enemy was taking the fullest advantage of his violation
of Belgian territory, and that he was protected to the right
of his advance, at least as far west as Soignies and Nivelles, whence
he was moving direct upon the British and 5th French Armies.

In further proof that, at this time, no idea of retreat was in the
minds of the leaders of the Allied Armies, I received late on Friday,
the 21st, General Lanrezac's orders to his troops. All his corps were
in position south of the Sambre, and he was only waiting the
development of a move by the 3rd and 4th French Armies from the line
Mezieres--Longwy to begin his own advance.

As regards our own troops, on the evening of the 21st, the cavalry,
under Allenby, were holding the line of the Conde Canal with four
brigades. Two brigades of horse artillery were in reserve at
Harmignies. The 5th Cavalry Brigade, under Chetwode, composed of the
Scots Greys, 12th Lancers, and 20th Hussars, were at Binche, in touch
with the French.

Reconnoitring squadrons and patrols were pushed out towards Soignies
and Nivelles.

I visited Allenby's Headquarters in the afternoon of the 21st, and
discussed the situation with him. I told him on no account to commit
the cavalry to any engagement of importance, but to draw off towards
our left flank when pressed by the enemy's columns, and there remain
in readiness for action and reconnoitring well to the left.

The 1st Army Corps, u