ordered to move towards the line La Fere--Noyon.
On the evening of the 26th, Headquarters were moved to Noyon, where I
arrived late at night to consider the possibilities of making a stand
behind the Oise.
On the 27th the orders issued for the efficient conduct of the retreat
began to take effect, and the cavalry kept the enemy well at bay.
Smith-Dorrien reported himself in the early hours of the morning, and
later Major Dawnay (2nd Life Guards)--the recollection of whose
splendid and invaluable services until he fell at the head
of his regiment will for ever remain with me--brought news of Haig's
progress, whilst Shea of the Indian cavalry--afterwards a renowned
leader of a Division at the front--told me of the valuable _role_
which was being so efficiently performed by the Cavalry.
In a telegram, which I communicated to the troops, General Joffre very
handsomely acknowledged what he described as the "invaluable" services
rendered to the Allied cause by the British Army throughout the past
few days.
It was a sincere gratification to the Army to see the generous terms
in which the French Commander-in-Chief expressed his appreciation.
I spent the early hours of the 27th in personally reconnoitring the
country bordering the south bank of the Oise, in the neighbourhood of
Noyon.
The one idea which now possessed my mind was the possibility of making
a stand with the object of obtaining the necessary time for rest, and
to make good equipment and bring up reinforcements.
At first sight it appeared to me that the line of the Oise and its
tributary canalised waters offered such an opportunity.
The cursory examination of the ground which I was able to make on the
morning of the 27th satisfied me that it possessed decided
capabilities for a defence which was not intended to be prolonged, and
I thought, also, that the tortuous course of the river afforded some
alternative features, by availing ourselves of which a powerful
offensive might be commenced at the right time.
During the day I had another interview with Joffre, which
took place before I had time to estimate the actual fighting
capabilities of the 2nd Corps and the 4th Division.
I was not even then fully aware of the terrible extent to which we had
suffered at Le Cateau. That these losses were heavy I never doubted,
but I had no idea, until many hours later, that they were such as must
paralyse for several days any movement in the direction of tak
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