Edward Grey was not sent. In the
conversation which followed between us all, Lord Kitchener appeared to
take grave exception to certain views which I expressed as to the
expediency of leaving the direction of the operations in the field in
the hands of the military chiefs in command in the field.
He abruptly closed the discussion and requested me to
accompany him for a private interview in another room.
When we were alone he commenced by entering a strong objection to the
tone I assumed. Upon this I told him all that was in my mind. I said
that the command of the British Forces in France had been entrusted to
me by His Majesty's Government; that I alone was responsible to them
for whatever happened, and that on French soil my authority as regards
the British Army must be supreme until I was legally superseded by the
same authority which had put that responsibility upon me. I further
remarked that Lord Kitchener's presence in France in the character of
a soldier could have no other effect than to weaken and prejudice my
position in the eyes of the French and my own countrymen alike. I
reminded him of our service in the field together some 13 years
before, and told him that I valued highly his advice and assistance,
which I would gladly accept as such, but that I would not tolerate any
interference with my executive command and authority so long as His
Majesty's Government chose to retain me in my present position. I
think he began to realise my difficulties, and we finally came to an
amicable understanding.
Important telegrams and messages were then brought me, and I told Lord
Kitchener that it was impossible for me to absent myself any longer
from my Headquarters, whither I at once repaired with all possible
speed.
It is very difficult for any but soldiers to understand the real
bearing and significance of this Paris incident. If the confidence of
the troops in their commander is shaken in the least degree, or if his
influence, power and authority are prejudiced by any display of
distrust in his ability to conduct operations, however slight the
indications of such distrust may be, the effect reacts instantly
throughout the whole Army. This is more than ever true with troops
which, as at the moment in question, were being subjected to great and
severe demands upon their courage, endurance, and, above all, _faith
in their leaders_.
Then again there was the effect which might have been produced on the
French. M
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