them successively, as the closing in of the
inner flank of the 5th and 6th Armies shortens the front allotted to
the British Army.

"It would be advisable for the Commander-in-Chief and the Field
Marshal to arrange mutually, at some convenient date, the conditions
under which the transport of these troops by rail should be made.

"5. Referring to the disembarkation of the 7th and 8th
Divisions, the Commander-in-Chief is most anxious that
these two Divisions should proceed as soon as possible
to Boulogne. Their arrival at Lille, where they are to
join the British Forces pushed to the front, would then
be more rapid than if they were disembarked at Havre
and the arrangements would be simpler. Their movement
from the port of landing could be carried out by road
with the assistance of the railway for marching troops.

"6. The Indian Divisions should be moved to the
neighbourhood of Lille as soon as the Field Marshal
reports that they are ready.

"The G.O. C.-in-C. hopes that these proposals are in accordance with
the views expressed by the Field Marshal in his letter of September
30th, and he would be glad to be assured of this as soon as possible
in order that steps may be taken to execute them.

(Signed) "J. JOFFRE."

I acknowledged the above in these terms:--

"October 1st, 1914.

"The Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief the British Forces has duly
received the note dated October 1st, 1914, from His Excellency the
Commander-in-Chief.

"He is extremely glad to find that the proposals contained in his last
note meet with the approval of the Commander-in-Chief.

"Such modifications as are suggested in the present note are perfectly
feasible, and Sir John French will give immediate effect to them.

"The necessary orders were issued to-day, and the preliminary
movements are now in progress.

"The Field Marshal hopes that the 2nd Cavalry Division will commence
its march towards Lille on the morning of October 3rd."

CHAPTER VIII.

THE SIEGE AND FALL OF ANTWERP.

In our appreciation of the situation at British Headquarters on
October 1st it was considered that the reduction of Antwerp was at
this moment the great objective of the enemy. Personally, I had no
reason to think that Antwerp was in any immediate danger, and
therefo