other hand, although from the south of Ypres to La Bassee the
situation would remain very precarious, I conceived that it might be
possible to hold on till support could arrive.

Since the solution of the problem, as presented to my mind, resolved
itself into a balance of _certain disaster_ against a disaster which,
although much greater in degree, was still _not_ a _certainty_, I
determined to guard against the former; and on the evening of the 19th
I sent for Sir Douglas Haig and gave him his instructions.

I explained the situation as clearly as possible, and showed him on
the map where and how we thought the enemy's troops were distributed.
I said that at the moment I did not think there was much
more than the 3rd German Reserve Corps, with possibly one or two
Divisions attached, between Ostend and Menin, but that all reports
pointed to an early arrival of strong reinforcements from the centre
and east of Belgium.

I pointed out to Haig how much importance I attached to the clearing
of Ostend and Bruges before these reinforcements could arrive. I said
I hoped that, with the assistance of the French and Belgian troops on
the north, and Rawlinson on his right flank, he would be able to
effect this object and perhaps, with luck, throw the enemy back on
Ghent. I told him that this was what I particularly wanted to bring
about, but that he would have to be guided by the course of events. I
informed him of Wilson's visit to Foch on the 16th, and Foch's promise
that he would strongly support us on the north.

Orders were then issued to the 1st Corps, of which the following is a
summary:--

"The 1st Corps will advance _via_ Thourout with the object of
capturing Bruges. If this is proved to be feasible and
successful, every endeavour must be made to turn the enemy's left
flank and drive him back to Ghent. The situation, however, is
very uncertain, and in the first instance it is only possible to
direct the 1st Corps with its right on the line Ypres--Roulers.
Should the forces of the enemy, reported to be moving west
between Iseghem and Courtrai, seriously menace the 4th Corps, it
is left to the discretion of the Commander of the 1st Corps to
lend this Corps such assistance as may be necessary."

It had been arranged by the Admiralty that some battleships were to be
held in readiness at Dover, to co-operate with our movements
on the north coast should opportunity offer.