aerodromes
as they existed if these latter were moved to Calais and its
neighbourhood. Let those who have had experience of the full effect of
air raids on London during the war judge what this might have meant.
Had the western Channel ports been in German occupation, the horrors
of these air raids would have been multiplied a hundredfold.

It is only necessary to add that, during the war, heavy artillery
succeeded in making effective practice at ranges greater than the
distance between Calais and Dover.

I think it is reasonable to deduce from this argument that the stakes
for which we were playing at the great Battle of Ypres were nothing
less than the safety, indeed, the very existence, of the British
Empire.

Now, the Germans had two distinct opportunities of bringing about such
a situation as I have contemplated--

(1) To reinforce their right much sooner than they did--even
though, by so doing, they had to make slight and unimportant
sacrifices elsewhere--and to take up a line of entrenchments
resting on the sea at Dieppe, whence they could have run their
trenches east and joined up with their main line before
de Castelnau's flank movement could possibly have developed.

(2) By successfully attacking the British and French forces to
the east of Ypres, and driving them back to the sea.

This latter alternative, as we know, is what they actually attempted;
which mighty effort, together with our successful and prolonged
resistance, constituted the First Battle of Ypres.

No one who has done me the honour of reading this book so far can
suppose that I did not realise this danger.

I am free to confess, however, that, on October 15th, 1914, the day
upon which I date the opening of the Battle of Ypres, I thought that
the danger was past. I believed that the enemy had exhausted his
strength in the great bid he had made to smash our armies on the Marne
and to capture Paris. The fine successes gained by the cavalry and the
3rd Corps, narrated in the last chapter, did much to confirm these
impressions on my mind.

I could not bring myself to suppose for one moment that, with such
resources as the Germans afterwards showed that they had at this time
in reserve, they could have let slip such an opportunity as we
afforded them by our long delay on the Aisne and our perilous
disregard of the danger in the north. One of their punishments will be
the corroding contemplation of