der Marwitz, Commanding the 4th German
Cavalry Corps, who, in wiring to the Commander of the 6th German Army,
commented upon the "weakness" of the 2nd Corps' attack, and the ease
with which he had been able to withstand it.
After the 15th, however, the result of my own observations, and the
reports I continued to receive of the enemy's constantly increasing
strength all along our line, caused me anxiety and induced me to send
the message I have mentioned to Foch.
I was far from satisfied with the situation in the north. Although no
reports had reached us of any great concentration of the enemy there,
I had much reason to fear that troops were being moved east across
Belgium to reinforce him. The French troops on the Yser were not
numerous, and they included many Territorials, whilst the Belgians
were completely tired out. On the right of the Belgians, as far as
Menin, there were only the 3rd Cavalry and 7th Infantry Divisions,
both of which stood in need of rest and refit.
Ours was a tremendously long line to guard with so few troops
available. If the enemy broke through the left flank all the British
would be turned, the Belgians and the French troops with them would be
cut off and the sea-coast towns would be gone.
When I looked further south, the prospect was no better. The enemy was
daily and almost hourly getting stronger in front of our line, which
was held by the cavalry and by the 2nd and 3rd Corps. The endurance of
these troops had been heavily taxed, and I had practically
no reserves. Moreover, they were extended on a front much too wide for
their numbers, especially north of the Lys.
Bad as a complete break through by the enemy in the north would have
been, a wedge driven through our lines south of Menin would have
entailed still more disastrous consequences.
In a message which I received from de Maud'huy on the 16th, he
expressed great fear that the Germans were intent on attacking between
us and finally separating us. Had they accomplished this, the eventual
alternatives before the British Army would have been to surrender or
be driven into the sea.
I pondered long and deeply on the situation, and finally arrived at
the following conclusion:--
If the enemy's threats against Ypres and the Yser were not strongly
met by a corresponding offensive move, then a break through at some
point in that neighbourhood by the Germans was a practical certainty,
and the seaboard would be theirs.
On the
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