could rally.
At this time all was quiet on the front of the 2nd Division, while on
the south the 7th Division, assisted by troops which General Bulfin
had collected under his orders, were being heavily shelled. The
retirement of the 1st Division exposed the left of the 7th Division
and, owing to this, the Royal Scots Fusiliers (21st Brigade), who
stuck to their trenches, were cut off and surrounded. A strong
infantry attack was delivered against the right of the 7th Division at
1.30 p.m., a short time after the G.O.C. 7th Division had moved two
battalions of his reserve in rear of his right.
On receiving a report of the situation on the front of the 1st
Division, Haig issued the following order:--
"The line Frezenberg--Westhoek--bend of Main Road--Klein
Zillebeke--bend of canal to be held at all costs."
From Haig and Gough I learned that Lomax had been badly wounded,
Monro, commanding the 2nd Division, temporarily disabled, and several
Divisional Staff Officers killed at 1.15 p.m. that afternoon, when the
Headquarters of the 1st and 2nd Divisions were shelled. On this
General Bulfin was ordered to take command of the 1st Division, handing
over the command of the 2nd and 3rd Brigades to General Lord Cavan,
commanding the 4th (Guards) Brigade. Amongst the dead was poor Freddie
Kerr, of the Highland Light Infantry, whom I had known very well at
Aldershot. He was a rising man, and one of the most promising young
Staff Officers in the Army. But the worst news was that the 1st
Division had broken back and were in full retreat, only a mile or so
to the east of where we were standing, with the Germans at their
heels.
What grieved me almost more than anything else was that the 1st Corps
should at last be forced back after the glorious stand they had made.
I felt that they had done far more than could be expected of any men,
and that even if they were driven to the sea they had earned their
country's lasting gratitude for the determined fight they had made. No
shadow of blame could be laid upon them or their commander.
I sought to express what I felt to Douglas Haig in order to try and
soften the cruel blow I knew this catastrophe would be to him and to
his command. To me, indeed, it seemed as though our line at last was
broken. If this were the case, the immense numerical superiority of
the enemy would render retreat a very difficult operation,
particularly in view of the fact that Ypres and the River Yser lay in
o
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