My advanced Headquarters were now established at Bailleul, and a long
discussion I had there on the 19th with Pulteney and Smith-Dorrien
showed that our front south of Menin was being still more severely
pressed.

An attempt by the 4th Corps to advance on Menin ended in failure.

The Germans were also fairly active in the north. They pushed back de
Mitry's French Cavalry Corps towards Staden and Zarren, and heavily
attacked the Belgians at Nieuport, but our Allies held their ground
well.

The events of the 20th showed still greater pressure by the enemy. The
3rd Cavalry Division was driven back to the line Zonnebeke--St.
Julien--Pilkem by infantry and guns advancing from Roulers.

The centre of Allenby's Cavalry Corps fell back on Messines, which
place was heavily shelled.

In order to cement the connection between the 2nd and 3rd Corps (now
only maintained by Conneau's French cavalry) I sent the 19th Brigade
to be placed at Pulteney's disposal.

Haig sent two battalions of the 4th Guards Brigade to support the
centre of the 4th Corps between Byng and Capper.

On the 21st, all my worst forebodings as to the enemy's increasing
strength were realised. Intercepted wireless messages established the
certainty that the comparatively small German force which on the night
of the 18th we judged to be between Ostend and Menin, was now
reinforced by no less than four Corps, namely, the 21st, 22nd, 26th
and 27th Reserve Corps. These Corps had been hastily formed, and were
not composed of the best troops, They were also weak in
numbers and artillery as compared with other Corps.

Although I looked for a great addition to the enemy's numbers within a
few days from the 18th, the strength they actually reached astounded
me. This, taken with the speed in which they appeared in the field,
came like a veritable bolt from the blue.

My only comfort lay in the certainty that my direction of the 1st
Corps to the north was sound and best calculated to meet these new and
startling conditions.

All hope of any immediate offensive had now to be abandoned. It was
simply "up to us" to hold on like grim death to our positions by hard,
resolute fighting, until relief in some shape could come.

It may well be asked how I expected such relief to be afforded, and
whence it could arrive. What hope could be justified in face of such
overpowering odds?

As far as reinforcements went, all I had to look to was the Indian
Corps, one Divis