ion of Menin and
Courtrai.

The capture of the high ground about Kemmel proved to be of the utmost
importance to us throughout the Battle of Ypres.

On the 12th the Belgian Army assembled in the area
Ostend--Dixmude--Furnes--Nieuport, but on the 15th withdrew entirely
behind the Yser to the north of Ypres.

The French Naval Division and other troops which had been covering the
Belgian retreat were at Dixmude and Nieuport. A French Territorial
Division from Cassel had been moved to Ypres.

On the 14th it was reported that about 10,000 German troops from
Antwerp were moving on Bruges and Roulers, and that another German
Division from Antwerp had reached Courtrai.

On the 15th, the enemy strengthened their line on the Lys, where part
of the 19th and 12th German Corps were reported to be with their right
on Menin, and, finally, the Germans were said to be advancing in four
columns to the line Ghistelles--Roulers.

I now turn to the operations of the 2nd Corps, which, it will be
remembered, was on the right of the British forces to the east of
Bethune.

I visited Smith-Dorrien at his Headquarters almost every day between
the 11th and the 15th. On each occasion I was more and more impressed
by the exceptionally difficult nature of the country in this part of
our field of operations.

If we draw a line on the map starting from Lens on the south and
following north through Lievin, La Bassee, Fromelles, Armentieres,
almost to the valley of the River Douve on the north, the whole
_terrain_ for several miles to the east and west of that line strongly
resembles the English Black Country. North of Lievin the ground is
very flat, whilst mining works, slag heaps, factories and mining
villages completely cover the surface in all directions.

There is a large mining population whose tenements (sometimes single
houses, sometimes separate rows or cottages) cover the whole area.
There are also towns of some size, such as Bethune, Noeux-les-Mines,
Nieppe, and Armentieres.

The ground, moreover, was of such a character as to render effective
artillery support to an infantry attack most difficult. The roads were
rough, narrow, badly paved, and very slippery in wet weather, which
caused movements by motor to be a work of time and difficulty,
particularly in the case of the heavy motor transport passing between
the troops and their supply depots. This marked defect in the roads
applied, however, to the whole area over which the Br