ay that Air
and Intelligence Reports, combined with the impression which my own
observations had made upon me, left no doubt in my mind that the
German retreat had really been in full progress for many hours, and
that the British Army must be immediately moved in a direction which
would bring it in close contact with the enemy.

Orders were therefore issued directing the march on the Grand Morin
River, which was to be forced and passed with all possible speed on
the 7th.

Joffre's request to me to move in a rather more northerly direction
pointed to some such conclusion; but I do not think that his
information during the day had impressed him to the same extent with
the drastic change in the situation, and the fact that the Germans had
so soon taken the alarm and been overtaken by a veritable "panic."

My intention to close at all speed with the enemy had to be tempered
by consideration for the French Armies on my flank, both of
which were opposed by much larger forces.

It was necessary to keep close touch with Franchet d'Esperey on my
right, and to direct the movements of the 3rd Corps on my left so as
to bring the best possible support to the hard-pressed right of the
6th Army, who were fighting there so gallantly and well.

The cavalry acted with great vigour in advance of the Army throughout
the 7th, and on that day the Grand Morin River was forced and
positions were taken up well to the north-east of it.

The 5th and 6th French Armies were both heavily engaged throughout the
7th. The left of the 5th Army on my right reached La Ferte--Gaucher at
nightfall.

The position of the British Army at daybreak on the 8th was,
roughly:--

_3rd Corps_--La Haute Maison.
_2nd Corps_--Aulnoy and neighbourhood.
_1st Corps_--Chailly and Jouy-sur-Morin.

The problem before me on the night of the 7th-8th may be stated
thus:--

I knew that the 5th Army on my right had been heavily opposed on the
7th, and that powerful forces of the enemy were still in front of it.
The 6th Army was fighting hard west of the Ourcq, opposed to nearly
all the German 1st Army. I gathered at this time that the enemy forces
opposing our own immediate advance consisted chiefly of cavalry with a
strong artillery supporting, backed up by some infantry detachments.

I have referred before in this book to a visit I paid to Germany in
1911. On that occasion I saw a great deal of German cavalry in
manoeuvre, and the knowledge I thus acquired