and to these points the
British forces were directed to move on the following day, destroying
the bridges after they had passed.

By early morning of September 3rd, General Joffre's letter (quoted above)
had reached me, by which I judged that, whilst generally agreeing in my
views, the General did not think it advisable to attempt a deliberate
defence of the Marne. On this, the orders given to the British troops on
the night of the 2nd were modified, and they were directed to continue
their march to the line Montry--Crecy--Coulommiers.

Reinforcements of all kinds were ordered up to these points and were
well on their way, but the railways were badly blocked and there was
much delay.

I must now turn to the discussion of important information which began
to reach us on the afternoon of the 3rd regarding the movements of the
enemy.

It appeared that a direct advance on Paris by the German right wing
was no longer intended. They were reported to be moving in large
columns south-east and east. A few regiments were said to be moving
east by train. Later on, further reports arrived that the country in
our front for several miles north of the Marne was clear of
the enemy. No less than four German Corps were said to be
concentrating on Chateau-Thierry and to the east along the Marne, and
it was reported that they had begun an attack on the 5th French Army.
The latest information told us that Chateau-Thierry was in the hands
of the enemy, and that the 5th French Army was retiring south to the
Seine.

The ideas underlying this concentration on their centre by the enemy
look as if it was based on a totally wrong appreciation of our
situation. The Germans were ignorant of the real strength which was
gathering north of Paris in the formation of the 6th French Army. They
regarded the British Army as practically crushed, and almost useless
as a fighting force.

Relying upon this, they had no hesitation in leaving what they thought
were the remnants of the Allied forces immediately north and east of
the Paris fortifications to be dealt with by such of their own forces
as were operating through Amiens and on their extreme right. The
German Higher Command then decided to strike with overwhelming force
at the Allied centre south of the Marne and to cut our Armies in two.

The first necessity for the enemy was a quick decision by a great
victory to be achieved at once. They were out-marching their supplies;
there was Russia to