ntier, where he was being
seriously threatened by the Russians. Joffre's natural desire to
profit by this, coupled with his fears for the safety of Paris, made
him very anxious to take the offensive at the earliest possible
moment. He came to see me on the afternoon of the 29th August at
Compiegne, and urged these views upon me. I remained firm in my
absolute conviction that the British forces could not effectively
fulfil their share in such action for some days, and that, so far as
we were concerned, a further retreat was inevitable. I assured the
French Commander-in-Chief that no serious gap should be made in his
line by any premature or hasty retirement, but I imperatively demanded
the necessary time to refit and obtain reinforcements.

I strongly represented to Joffre the advantage of drawing the German
armies on still further from their base, even although we had to move
south of the Marne. Indeed, the ideas which I afterwards expressed at
the British Embassy in Paris to M. Millerand, the French Minister of
War, in the presence of Lord Kitchener, were the same which I had in
my mind during this interview with Joffre, namely, that our stand
should be made on some line between the Marne and the Seine.

The French Army was still in full retreat. The 6th French Army on our
left was not yet formed, and the Commander-in-Chief had put no
definite plan of attack before me, with an assigned _role_ which he
desired me to fulfil. All he asked me to do was to remain in
the line and fill up the gap between the 5th and 6th Armies. This I
had every intention of doing.

I am bound to say that I had to make this decision in the face of
resistance from some of my subordinate commanders, who took a
depressed view as to the condition of their troops. When I discussed
the situation at a meeting of British commanders held at Compiegne,
Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien expressed it as his opinion that the only
course open to us was to retire to our base, thoroughly refit,
re-embark and try to land at some favourable point on the coast-line.
I refused to listen to what was the equivalent of a counsel of
despair.

Our communications with Havre being now dangerously threatened, it
became necessary to effect a change of base and establish a fresh
line. St. Nazaire and Nantes were fixed upon, with Le Mans as advanced
base.

The morning of the 30th found our cavalry with two brigades to the
north-west of Compiegne, one to the north and one to t