st arrived at cantonments at 10 p.m. or 11 p.m. on the 25th,
after a heavy day's march and some severe fighting, but they could in
such an emergency have marched at dawn. The 4th Division on the left
of the 2nd Corps was comparatively fresh.
I visited in particular one Artillery Brigade, some of whose guns had
been saved from capture on the previous day by the cavalry. The
Brigade Commander broke down with emotion as he recounted to me the
glorious bravery displayed by Francis Grenfell and the 9th Lancers.
This Brigade fought magnificently for several hours next day on the Le
Cateau position.
All reconnaissance and intelligence reports received up to midnight on
the 25th concur in saying that Cambrai was then still in the
possession of the French, and that the position there was not yet
seriously threatened; further, that whilst there were clear signs of
the outflanking movement in progress, no considerable bodies of the
enemy had yet crossed the line Valenciennes--Douai, and that, after
their repulse at Solesmes by McCracken and Allenby, the enemy was not
in strength south of the line Valenciennes--Maubeuge.
This estimate of the situation was confirmed by a German wireless
message, intercepted towards the evening of the 26th, which stated
that the outflanking German Corps was only at that time "moving
towards" Cambrai, and that the remaining Corps, which were engaged in
the frontal attack, were only then "moving on" towards Cattenieres,
Walincourt and Le Cateau respectively.
The 1st Corps had, as we know, experienced a much harder day's march
on the 25th, and was attacked at Landrecies and its neighbourhood
before it could get any rest at all. Sir Douglas correctly appreciated
the strength of the enemy on his immediate front and gauged the
situation, namely, the German design to impose on us the idea that he
was in great strength, and to pin our troops to the ground whilst his
flanking movement became effective.
For this purpose the enemy had hurried forward a large force of
Artillery, composed of guns and howitzers of all calibres, escorted
and protected by four Cavalry Divisions and a limited number of jaeger
battalions.
These troops were pushed forward against the 2nd Corps at Le Cateau as
they had been against the 1st Corps at Landrecies, and with a
precisely similar purpose.
The superb gallantry of the troops, and the skilful leading by
Divisional and Brigade and Battalion Commanders, helped very
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