s details the actual situation on the morning of August 26th.

At the time the dispatch was written, indeed, I was entirely
ignorant of the material support which was rendered throughout the day
by Generals Sordet and d'Amade, and I accepted without question the
estimate made by the commander of the 2nd Corps as to the nature of
the threat against him and the position of the German forces opposed
to him.

It is very difficult for the uninitiated to realise the concentration
which the direction of an Army carrying out a vigorous offensive like
that of the Marne, demands from the brain of the Commander-in-Chief,
if he is to make the best use of the forces under his command.

In the surroundings and under the conditions of a great battle, the
preparation of material for and the compilation of any dispatch is a
matter of great difficulty. It is very easy to say: "Why not employ
others?" I have always held that it is only the General who conducts
an operation of any magnitude who can, or should, sum up and describe
it. No one else can know what was passing in his mind, or how his
judgment was directed and formed by the swiftly moving procession of
events.

Nor can _exact_ information become available for weeks or months,
sometimes, indeed, even for years, after the conclusion of a
particular series of operations.

In more than one of the accounts of the retreat from Mons, it is
alleged that some tacit consent at least was given at Headquarters at
St. Quentin to the decision arrived at by the commander of the 2nd
Corps. I owe it to the able and devoted officers of my Staff to say
that there is not a semblance of truth in this statement.

CHAPTER V.

FURTHER COURSE OF THE RETREAT.

General Joffre had arranged for a conference at my Headquarters at St.
Quentin with Lanrezac and myself, to take place early on the 26th.

I had reached St. Quentin at about 8 a.m. on the 25th. There had been
little sleep during the night for any of us. In the earlier hours
continual reports came in regarding the dangerous position of the 1st
Corps. In addition to the unfortunate but inevitable delay in
commencing their march in the morning, the troops were further greatly
embarrassed and worried by the retirement of the French from the
Sambre, and their convergence on our own line of march.

The enemy's cavalry, supported by guns, Jaeger, and detachments of
Infantry carried on motor cars and lorries, closely pressed our
columns