red with their regimental comrades, have in
war--if some of them could have watched that scene, they would be more
chary of forming such opinions and spreading such wrong
ideas.

Personally, I have always been far more a regimental than a Staff
Officer, and I have every reason to sympathise with the former, but
when I have witnessed scenes and gone through days such as I am now
very imperfectly describing, and when I know such days to be frequent
and long drawn out occurrences in war, it makes my blood boil to hear
and to read of the calumnies which are often heaped upon the head of
the unfortunate "Staff."

Murray did splendid work that day and set the best of examples. On my
arrival at Bavai he reported the situation fully and clearly to me.
The action of the cavalry and the 19th Brigade on the left had greatly
relieved the heavy pressure on the 5th Division, and the retirement
was proceeding fairly well.

Information had, however, reached me of the defeat and retreat of the
3rd French Army, and the continued falling back of Lanrezac. I judged
also, by the method and direction of the attack, that strenuous
attempts were being made to turn our left flank and press me back on
Maubeuge. The force opposed to me was growing in size, and I judged it
to be more than double my numbers. As subsequent information proved,
we were actually opposed by four corps and at least two cavalry
divisions.

Early in the afternoon it was clear to me that further definite
decisions must be taken. We could not stand on the line towards which
the troops were now retiring.

The fortress of Maubeuge lay close on my right rear. It was well
fortified and provisioned. It is impossible for anyone, who has not
been situated as I was, to realise the terrible temptation which such
a place offers to an army seeking shelter against overpowering odds.

For a short time on this fateful afternoon I debated within
myself whether or not I should yield to this temptation; but I did not
hesitate long, because there were two considerations which forced
themselves prominently upon my mind.

In the first place, I had an instinctive feeling that this was exactly
what the enemy was trying to make me do; and, in the second place, I
had the example of Bazaine and Metz in 1870 present in my mind, and
the words of Sir Edward Hamley's able comment upon the decision of the
French Marshal came upon me with overwhelming force. Hamley described
it as "The anxiety o