avalry.
During the night the 4th Division had nearly completed their
detrainment, and were taking up the position assigned to them towards
Cambrai. In the course of the morning of the 25th I visited Snow, who
commanded this Division, and went over the ground with him.
The only action of importance during the day occurred at
Solesmes, when the rearguard of the 3rd Division under McCracken was
heavily attacked. Allenby, with the 2nd Cavalry Brigade (4th Dragoon
Guards, 9th Lancers, and 18th Hussars), came to his assistance and
enabled him to continue his retreat. He did not, however, arrive at
his appointed destination till late in the evening, and then it was
with very tired men.
The reports received up till noon of the 25th showed that the French
were retiring all along the line, and there was no longer any doubt in
my mind as to the strength and intention of the enemy in our own
immediate front. Three Corps and a Cavalry Division were concentrating
against us, whilst a fourth Corps and another Cavalry Division were
trying to turn our western flank.
I had now to consider the position most carefully and again come to a
momentous decision. Was I to stand and fight on the line to which the
Army was now retiring (Le Cateau--Cambrai) or continue the retreat at
daybreak?
To hold the Le Cateau position in view of the heavy threat on my front
and western flank was a decision which could only be justified if I
were sure of the absolute determination of the French Commander to
hold on all along the line with the utmost tenacity; but our Allies
were already a day's march in rear of us, and every report indicated
continual retreat. At least one Army Corps and two Cavalry Divisions
of the enemy were engaged in an outflanking movement on my left, in
which they had already made some progress, and the only help I could
depend upon in that quarter was from two French Reserve Divisions
spread out on an enormous front towards Dunkirk, and very hastily and
indifferently entrenched. It was unlikely that they would be able to
oppose any effective resistance to the enemy's flank movement.
If this flank attack were successful, my communications with
Havre would be practically gone.
There had been neither time nor labour available to make the Le Cateau
position strong enough to withstand a serious onslaught by the
superior numbers which were advancing against my front, and the
British troops, which had been almost continuously m
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