at daybreak, and I decided to await
aircraft reports from Henderson before making any decided plan.

I instructed Sir Archibald Murray, my Chief of Staff, to remain for
the present at General Smith-Dorrien's Headquarters at Sars-la-Bruyere,
and gave him full instructions as to arrangements which must be made
if a retreat became necessary. I then went on to Valenciennes. General
Drummond (Commanding the 19th Infantry Brigade) and the French
Commandant at Valenciennes met me at the station.

I inspected a part of the entrenchments which were under construction,
and the disposition of the Territorial troops (two divisions under
General d'Amade) which were detailed to hold them and to guard our
left flank. The 19th Brigade (2nd Batt. R. Welsh Fusiliers, 1st Batt.
Scottish Rifles, 1st Batt. Middlesex Regt., and 2nd Batt. Argyle and
Sutherland Highlanders) was just completing its detrainment, and I
placed Drummond under the orders of General Allenby commanding the
Cavalry Division.

During this day (August 23rd) reports continued to reach me of heavy
pressure on our outposts all along the line, but chiefly between Conde
and Mons.

Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, it will be remembered, was now in command of
the 2nd Corps, having been sent out from England in succession to Sir
James Grierson on the latter's untimely death.

After my conference with the Corps Commanders on the morning of the
23rd, I left General Smith-Dorrien full of confidence in regard to his
position, but when I returned to my Headquarters in the afternoon,
reports came to hand that he was giving up the salient at Mons because
the outpost line at Obourg had been penetrated by the enemy, and that
he was also preparing to give up the whole of the line of the canal
before nightfall. He said that he anticipated a gap occurring in his
line between the 3rd and 5th Divisions in the neighbourhood of
Mariette, and he went so far as to make a request for help to the 1st
Corps.

Up to this time there was no decided threat in any strength on Conde,
Sir Horace, therefore, need not have feared an imminent turning
movement, and, as regards his front, he was nowhere threatened by
anything more than cavalry supported by small bodies of infantry.

At that time no directions for retreat had been issued from
Headquarters, although the Chief of the General Staff had been left at
Sars-la-Bruyere on purpose to give orders for such a movement if it
should become necessary.

Th