Mexico, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to vanquish Mr.
Wilson in the election. Mr. Theodore Roosevelt would then shout
himself hoarse to no purpose and Mr. Charles Hughes, the strongest
Republican candidate, would perhaps not even go so far as nomination
if his position seemed hopeless."
In that report I announced for the first time that Mr. Wilson had
so far changed his policy as now to put peace mediation in the
foreground and to give the question of the 'Freedom of the Seas'
second place. I shall return later to this political development.
When news reached Washington which left no doubt that the _Sussex_
had been torpedoed by a German submarine, I immediately cabled
to Berlin for instructions in order to be in a position to give
an official disavowal of the act. It required nothing further to
convince me that it was now a question of bend or break. I had no
means of knowing whether the supporters of the submarine campaign
or the partisans of an understanding with the United States would
win the day. In the former case war was inevitable. To provide for
the second alternative I recommended in my cablegram that there
should be no question of an official exchange of Notes, because
I was anxious that our withdrawal should not be accompanied by a
humiliation. If our Government were prepared to give way I regarded
as the most appropriate _modus procedenti_ the immediate issue of
instructions to me, empowering me to offer the American Government
satisfaction and compensation for this fresh incident. There was no
hope of purchasing immunity from a break with any less concession
than a pledge to carry on the submarine campaign for the future in
accordance with the principles laid down by international law for
cruiser warfare. I recommended, however, a provisional cessation
of the submarine war on the basis of an oral agreement with the
American Government. If this proposal had been acted on, the American
Government would have been obliged to follow suit and there would
have been no sharp exchange of Notes, which still further prejudiced
the position on both sides. If, after such a pause in the submarine
war and the establishment of a really clear diplomatic situation,
Mr. Wilson failed us and made no positive progress either with regard
to his programme for the 'Freedom of the Seas' or the conclusion of
peace, we should have held quite a different position from which--if
we really thought it desirable--to reop
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