uired restoration of
Belgium. Otherwise, unrestricted submarine warfare would have to
be seriously considered. Request you give purely personal opinion
without inquiry in any quarter.

"BETHMANN-HOLLWEG."

To this inquiry I replied as follows:

TELEGRAM IN CIPHER NO. 101

"Rye, 8th September, 1916.

"In reply to Telegram No. 74.

"Your question answered in substance by my telegram No. 100. I take
it then that your Excellency intends yourself to invite Wilson's
mediation. In so far as the United States of America concerns itself
with territorial questions--which hitherto I have always categorically
opposed--restoration of Belgium should constitute America's principal
interest, since public opinion is almost exclusively favorable to
this.

"If Wilson is re-elected, I think there is good prospect of his
mediation before the end of the year.

"From this point of view the attainment of peace through unrestricted
submarine war seems hopeless, since the United States would inevitably
be drawn into the war--no matter what may be the result of the
election--and consequently the war would be prolonged."

I should like particularly to draw the reader's attention to this
telegram, because it expresses definitely my opinion that the submarine
campaign could not bring us peace.

Soon afterwards I was again instructed by the Chancellor to hasten
Mr. Wilson's peace movement. His telegram is here reproduced:

TELEGRAM IN CIPHER

"Berlin, 26th September, 1916.

"For Your Excellency's personal information.

"The enemy's intention of breaking through our fronts has not, so
far, succeeded, and will not succeed, any more than his Salonika
and Dobrudja offensives. On the other hand, the operations of the
Central Powers against Rumania are making encouraging progress.
Whether we shall succeed this year in gaining a victory there that
will bring the war to an end is still doubtful; therefore, for the
present we must be prepared for a further prolonging of the war.
Meanwhile, the Imperial navy is confident that by the unrestricted
employment of large numbers of submarines they could in view of
England's economic position, meet with a success which would in
a few months make our principal enemy, England, more disposed to
entertain thoughts of peace. It is therefore essential that G.H.Q.
should include a submarine campaign among their other measures to
relieve the situation on the Somme Front, by impeding th