onal as though these words had not been
used. The use of these words in that sense, in a constitution, under
which all persons are presumed to be free, would involve no absurdity,
although it might be gratuitous and unnecessary.
It is a rule of law, in the construction of all statutes, contracts and
legal instruments whatsoever--_that is, those which courts design, not
to invalidate, but to enforce_--that where words are susceptible of two
meanings, one consistent, and the other inconsistent, with liberty,
justice and right, that sense is always to be adopted, which is
consistent with right, unless there be something in other parts of the
instrument sufficient to prove that the other is the true meaning. In
the case of no one of all these early state constitutions, is there any
thing in the other parts of them, to show that these words "free" and
"freemen" are used as the correlatives of slavery. The rule of law,
therefore, is imperative that they must be regarded in the sense
consistent with liberty and right.
If this rule, that requires courts to give an innocent construction to
all words that are susceptible of it, were not imperative, courts might,
at their own pleasure, pervert the honest meaning of the most honest
statutes and contracts, into something dishonest, for there are almost
always words used in the most honest legislation, and in the most honest
contracts, that, by implication or otherwise, are capable of conveying
more than one meaning, and even a dishonest meaning. If courts _could_
lawfully depart from the rule, that requires them to attribute an honest
meaning to all language that is susceptible of such a meaning, it would
be nearly impossible to frame either a statute or a contract, which the
judiciary might not _lawfully_ pervert to some purpose of injustice.
There would obviously be no security for the honest administration of
any honest law or contract whatsoever.
This rule applies as well to constitutions as to contracts and statutes;
for constitutions are but contracts between the people, whereby they
grant authority to, and establish law for the government.
What other meaning, then, than as correlatives of slavery, are the words
"free" and "freemen" susceptible of, as they are used in the early state
constitutions?
Among the definitions given by Noah Webster are these:
"_Freeman._ One who enjoys, or is entitled to a franchise or peculiar
privilege; as the freemen of a city or state
|