flatly denying the authority of those who enacted
it. They (the court) will themselves add nothing to the language of the
statute, to help out its supposed meaning. They will imply nothing,
infer nothing, and assume nothing, except what is inevitable; they will
not go out of the letter of the statute in search of any _historical_
evidence as to the meaning of the legislature, to enable them to
effectuate any _unjust_ intentions not fully expressed by the statute
itself. Wherever a statute is supposed to have in view the
accomplishment of any unjust end, they will apply the most stringent
principles of construction to prevent that object's being effected. They
will not go a hair's breadth beyond the literal or inevitable import _of
the words_ of the statute, even though they should be conscious, all the
while, that the real intentions of the makers of it would be entirely
defeated by their refusal. The rule, (as has been already stated,) is
laid down by the supreme court of the United States in these words:

"Where rights are infringed, where fundamental principles are
overthrown, where the general system of the law is departed from, the
legislative intention must be expressed with _irresistible clearness_,
to induce a court of justice to suppose a design to effect such
objects."--(_United States_ vs. _Fisher et al., 2 Cranch_, 390.)[18]

Such has become the settled doctrine of courts. And although it does not
come up to the true standard of law, yet it is good in itself, so far as
it goes, and ought to be unflinchingly adhered to, not merely for its
own sake, but also as a scaffolding, from which to erect that higher
standard of law, to wit, that no language or authority whatever can
legalize any thing inconsistent with natural justice.[19]

Another reason for the rules before given, against all constructions,
implications and inferences--except inevitable ones--in favor of
injustice, is, that but for them we should have no guaranty that our
honest contracts, or honest laws would be honestly administered by the
judiciary. It would be nearly or quite impossible for men, in framing
their contracts or laws, to use language so as to exclude every possible
implication in favor of wrong, if courts were allowed to resort to such
implications. _The law therefore excludes them_; that is, the ends of
justice--the security of men's rights under their honest contracts, and
under honest legislative enactments--make it imperative up