nstitutional, without any regard to the "persons" so
held, or the conditions on which they were held. It would be
constitutional, _solely because it purported to hold persons to service
or labor_. If this were the true doctrine, any of us, without respect of
persons, might be held to service or labor, at the pleasure of the
legislature. And then, if "service or labor" mean slavery, it would
follow that any of us, without discrimination, might be made slaves. And
thus the result would be, that the acts of a legislature would be
constitutional, _solely because they made slaves of the people_.
Certainly this would be a new test of the constitutionality of laws.
All the arguments in favor of slavery, that have heretofore been drawn
from this clause of the constitution, have been founded on the
assumption, that if an act of a legislature did but purport to "hold
persons to service or labor"--no matter how, on what conditions, or for
what cause--that fact alone was sufficient to make the act
constitutional. The entire sum of the argument, in favor of slavery, is
but this, viz. the constitution recognizes the constitutionality of
"laws" that "hold persons to service or labor,"--slave acts "hold
persons to service or labor,"--therefore slave acts must be
constitutional. This profound syllogism is the great pillar of slavery
in this country. It has, (if we are to judge by results,) withstood the
scrutiny of all the legal acumen of this nation for fifty years and
more. If it should continue to withstand it for as many years as it has
already done, it will then be time to propound the following, to wit:
The state constitutions recognize the right of men to acquire property;
theft, robbery, and murder are among the modes in which property may be
acquired; therefore theft, robbery, and murder are recognized by these
constitutions as lawful.
No doubt the clause contemplates that there may be constitutional
"laws," under which persons may be "held to service or labor." But it
does not follow, therefore, that every act, that purports to hold
"persons to service or labor," is constitutional.
We are obliged, then, to determine whether a statute be constitutional,
before we can determine whether the "service or labor" required by it,
is sanctioned by the constitution as being lawfully required. The simple
fact, that the statute would "hold persons to service or labor," is, _of
itself_, no evidence, either for or against its constitut
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