nd the persons intended, and it is also more
consistent with the prevalent municipal, and with natural law.
And it makes no difference to this result, whether the word "free," in
the first article, be used in the political sense common at that day, or
as the correlative of slavery. In either case, the persons described as
"free," could not be made slaves.
7. The words "service or labor" cannot be made to include slavery,
unless by reversing the legal principle, that the greater includes the
less, and holding that the less includes the greater; that the innocent
includes the criminal; that a sanction of what is right, includes a
sanction of what is wrong.
Another clause relied on as a recognition of the constitutionality of
slavery, is the following, (Art. 1. Sec. 2.):
"Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the
several states, which may be included within this union, according to
their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the
whole number of _free_ persons, including those bound to service for
a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all
other persons."
The argument claimed from this clause, in support of slavery, rests
entirely upon the word "free," and the words "all other persons." Or
rather it rests entirely upon the meaning of the word "free," for the
application of the words "all other persons" depends upon the meaning
given to the word "free." The slave argument _assumes_, _gratuitously_,
that the word "free" is used as the correlative of slavery and thence it
infers that the words, "all other persons," mean slaves.
It is obvious that the word "free" affords no argument for slavery,
unless a meaning correlative with slavery be _arbitrarily_ given to it,
for the very purpose of _making_ the constitution sanction or recognize
slavery. Now it is very clear that no such meaning can be given to the
word, _for such a purpose_. The ordinary meaning of a word cannot be
thus arbitrarily changed, _for the sake of sanctioning a wrong_. A
choice of meaning would be perfectly allowable, and even obligatory, if
made for the purpose of _avoiding_ any such sanction; but it is entirely
inadmissable for the purpose of giving it. The legal rules of
interpretation, heretofore laid down, imperatively require this
preference of the right, over the wrong, in all cases where a word is
susceptible of different meanings.
The English law ha
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