he general government
itself could be republican, unless the state governments were republican
also. For example. The constitution provides, in regard to the choice of
congressional representatives, that "the electors in each state shall
have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous
branch of the state legislature." It was indispensable to the internal
quiet of each state, that the same body of electors, who should
participate in the suffrage of the state governments, should participate
also in the suffrage of the national one--and _vice versa_, that those
who should participate in the national suffrage, should also participate
in that of the state. If the general and state constitutions had each a
different body of electors within each state, it would obviously give
rise at once to implacable and irreconcilable feuds, that would result
in the overthrow of one or the other of the governments within the
state. Harmony or inveterate conflict was the only alternative. As
conflict would necessarily result in the destruction of one of the
governments, harmony was the only mode by which both could be preserved.
And this harmony could be secured only by giving to the same body of
electors, suffrage in both the governments.

If, then, it was indispensable to the existence and authority of both
governments, within the territory of each state, that the same body, and
only the same body of electors, that were represented in one of the
governments, should be represented in the other, it was clearly
indispensable, in order that the national one should be republican, that
the state governments should be republican also. Hence the interest
which the nation at large have in the republicanism of each of the state
governments.

It being necessary that the suffrage under the national government,
within each state, should be the same as for the state government, it is
apparent that unless the several state governments were all formed on
one general plan, or unless the electors of all the states were united
in the acknowledgement of some general controlling principle, applicable
to both governments, it would be impossible that they could unite in the
maintenance of a general government that should act in harmony with the
state governments; because the same body of electors, that should
support a despotic government in the state, could not consistently or
cordially unite, or even unite at all, in the support of a repub