nts from infringing the right of "the
people"--that is, of _any_ of the people--to do so; and more especially
of any whom congress have power to include in their militia. This right
of a man "to keep and bear arms," is a right palpably inconsistent with
the idea of his being a slave. Yet the right is secured as effectually
to those whom the states presume to call slaves, as to any whom the
states condescend to acknowledge free.
Under this provision any man has a right either to give or sell arms to
those persons whom the states call slaves; and there is no
_constitutional_ power, in either the national or state governments,
that can punish him for so doing; or that can take those arms from the
slaves; or that can make it criminal for the slaves to use them, if,
from the inefficiency of the laws, it should become necessary for them
to do so, in defence of their own lives or liberties; for this
constitutional right to keep arms implies the constitutional right to
use them, if need be, for the defence of one's liberty or life.
_Seventh._ The constitution of the United States declares that "no state
shall pass _any_ law impairing the obligation of contracts."
"The obligation of contracts," here spoken of, is, of necessity, the
_natural obligation_; for that is the only real or true obligation that
any contracts can have. It is also the only obligation, which courts
recognize in any case, except where legislatures arbitrarily interfere
to impair it. But the prohibition of the constitution is upon the
states' passing any law whatever that shall impair the natural
obligation of men's contracts. Yet, if slave laws were constitutional,
they would effectually impair the obligation of all contracts entered
into by those who are made slaves; for the slave laws must necessarily
hold that all a slave's contracts are void.
This prohibition upon the states to pass _any_ law impairing the natural
obligation of men's contracts, implies that all men have a
constitutional right to enter into all contracts that have a natural
obligation. It therefore _secures_ the constitutional right of all men
to enter into such contracts, and to have them respected by the state
governments. Yet this constitutional right of all men to enter into all
contracts that have a natural obligation, and to have those contracts
recognized by law as valid, is a right plainly inconsistent with the
idea that men can constitutionally be made slaves.
This prov
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