FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   66   67   68   69   70   71   72   73   74   75   76   77   78   79   80   81   82   83   84   85   86   87   88   89   90  
91   92   93   94   95   96   97   98   99   100   101   102   103   104   105   106   107   108   109   110   111   112   113   114   115   >>   >|  
atural right, that meaning, and _only that_ meaning, which is consistent with right, shall be attributed to them--unless other parts of the instrument overrule that interpretation. Another rule, (if indeed it be not the same,) is, that no language, except that which is peremptory, and no implication, except one that is inevitable, shall be held to authorize or sanction any thing contrary to natural right. Another rule is, that no _extraneous or historical evidence_ shall be admitted to fix upon a statute an unjust or immoral meaning, when the words themselves of the act are susceptible of an innocent one. One of the reasons of these stringent and inflexible rules, doubtless is, that judges have always known that, in point of fact, natural justice was itself law, and that nothing inconsistent with it could be made law, even by the most explicit and peremptory language that legislatures could employ.--But judges have always, in this country and in England, been dependent upon the executive and the legislature for their appointments and salaries, and been amenable to the legislature by impeachment. And as the executive and legislature have always enacted more or less statutes, and had more or less purposes to accomplish, that were inconsistent with natural right, judges have seen that it would be impossible for them to retain their offices, and at the same time maintain the integrity of the law against the will of those in whose power they were. It is natural also that the executive should appoint, and that the legislature should approve the appointment of no one for the office of judge, whose integrity they should suppose would stand in the way of their purposes.--The consequence has been that all judges, (probably without exception,) though they have not dared deny, have yet in practice yielded the vital principle of law; and have succumbed to the arbitrary mandates of the other departments of the government, so far as to carry out their enactments, though inconsistent with natural right. But, as if sensible of the degradation and criminality of so doing, they have made a stand at the first point at which they could make it, without bringing themselves in a direct collision with those on whom they were dependent. And that point is, that they will administer, as law, no statute, that is contrary to natural right, unless its language be so explicit and peremptory, that there is no way of evading its authority, but by
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   66   67   68   69   70   71   72   73   74   75   76   77   78   79   80   81   82   83   84   85   86   87   88   89   90  
91   92   93   94   95   96   97   98   99   100   101   102   103   104   105   106   107   108   109   110   111   112   113   114   115   >>   >|  



Top keywords:

natural

 

legislature

 

judges

 

inconsistent

 

executive

 

peremptory

 

meaning

 

language

 
statute
 

explicit


dependent
 

Another

 

purposes

 
contrary
 

integrity

 
appoint
 
approve
 

appointment

 

suppose

 

office


maintain

 

arbitrary

 
criminality
 

degradation

 
enactments
 

bringing

 

direct

 

evading

 
authority
 

administer


collision

 

exception

 

consequence

 

practice

 

yielded

 

mandates

 

departments

 

government

 
succumbed
 
principle

employ

 

admitted

 

evidence

 

historical

 

extraneous

 

unjust

 

immoral

 

susceptible

 

innocent

 

sanction