ought to be invalidated.
I think no one--no lawyer, certainly--will now deny that it is a legal
rule of interpretation--that must be applied to all statutes, and also
to all private contracts _that are to be enforced_--that an innocent
meaning, _and nothing beyond an innocent meaning_, must be given to all
language that will possibly bear such a meaning. All will probably admit
that the rule, as laid down by the supreme court of the United States,
is correct, to wit, that "where rights are infringed, where fundamental
principles are overthrown, where the general system of the law is
departed from, the legislative intention must be expressed with
_irresistible clearness_, to induce a court of justice to suppose a
design to effect such objects."
But perhaps it will be said that these rules, which apply to all
statutes, and to all private contracts that are to be enforced, do not
apply to the constitution. And why do they not? No reason whatever can
be given. A constitution is nothing but a contract, entered into by the
mass of the people, instead of a few individuals. This contract of the
people at large becomes a law unto the judiciary that administer it,
just as private contracts, (so far as they are consistent with natural
right,) are laws unto the tribunals that adjudicate upon them. All the
essential principles that enter into the question of obligation, in the
case of a private contract, or a legislative enactment, enter equally
into the question of the obligation of a contract agreed to by the whole
mass of the people. This is too self-evident to need illustration.
Besides, is it not as important to the safety and rights of all
interested, that a constitution or compact of government, established by
a whole people, should be so construed as to promote the ends of
justice, as it is that a private contract or a legislative enactment
should be thus construed? Is it not as necessary that some check should
be imposed upon the judiciary to prevent them from perverting, at
pleasure, the whole purpose and character of the government, as it is
that they should be restrained from perverting the meaning of a private
contract, or a legislative enactment? Obviously written compacts of
government could not be upheld for a day, if it were understood by the
mass of the people that the judiciary were at liberty to interpret them
according to their own pleasure, instead of their being restrained by
such rules as have now been l
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