ion of the prior legality of
slavery, and the gratuitous imputation of criminal intentions that are
not avowed in legal terms, that any sanction of slavery, (as a legal
institution,) can be extorted from it.
But legal rules of interpretation entirely forbid and disallow all such
implications, inferences, inuendos and double-entendre, all aid of
exterior evidence, all assumptions of the prior legality of slavery, and
all gratuitous imputations of criminal unexpressed intentions; and
consequently compel us to come back to the _letter_ of the instrument,
and find _there_ a distinct, clear, necessary, peremptory sanction for
slavery, or to surrender the point.
To the unprofessional reader these rules of interpretation will appear
stringent, and perhaps unreasonable and unsound. For his benefit,
therefore, the reasons on which they are founded, will be given. And he
is requested to fix both the reasons and the rules fully in his mind,
inasmuch as the whole legal meaning of the constitution, in regard to
slavery, may perhaps be found to turn upon the construction which these
rules fix upon its language.
But before giving the reasons of this rule, let us offer a few remarks
in regard to _legal_ rules of interpretation in general. Many persons
appear to have the idea that these rules have no foundation in reason,
justice or necessity; that they are little else than whimsical and
absurd conceits, arbitrarily adopted by the courts. No idea can be more
erroneous than this. The rules are absolutely indispensable to the
administration of the justice arising out of any class of legal
instruments whatever--whether the instruments be simple contracts
between man and man, or statutes enacted by legislatures, or fundamental
compacts or constitutions of government agreed upon by the people at
large. In regard to all these instruments, the _law_ fixes, and
necessarily must fix their meaning; and for the obvious reason, that
otherwise their meaning could not be fixed at all. The parties to the
simplest contract may disagree, or pretend to disagree, as to its
meaning, and of course as to their respective rights under it. The
different members of a legislative body, who vote for a particular
statute, may have different intentions in voting for it, and may
therefore differ, or pretend to differ, as to its meaning. The people
of a nation may establish a compact of government. The motives of one
portion may be to establish liberty, equalit
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