n it;" but this is an assumption which is true only in a sense that
would make it inconclusive with reference to the point at issue. It is
true, if it means merely that matter is destitute of spontaneity and
self-motion, such as belongs to living, voluntary agents; but it is not
true, if it means that matter is destitute of all inherent properties
and powers. Indeed, the "vis inertiae" which is ascribed to matter is
itself a power, and a very formidable one; it is described by Baxter
himself as "a kind of positive or stubborn inactivity," as "something
receding further from action than bare inactivity," for "_matter is so
powerfully inactive a thing_!" Now, if such a power as this may be
ascribed to matter, why may it not be admitted with equal safety that
God has bestowed on it certain other properties and powers, not
inconsistent with this, but additional to it; and that He has
established such relations and affinities between different substances
as that they may act and react--mechanically or chemically--on one
another? The phenomena of chemical affinity, the motions, and other
changes, produced by the contact, or even the juxtaposition, of certain
substances, and the variety of the resulting products, do certainly
evince the operation of other powers besides that of "vis inertiae;" and
we cannot see why these powers should be ascribed to "immaterial
spirits," any more than that of "vis inertiae" itself, or why it would be
a whit more dangerous to ascribe them to matter than to created
_spirits_. All that is required, as it appears to us, to establish the
dependence of the creature on the Creator and to vindicate the truth of
Christian Theism, is to maintain these two positions: _first_, that
whatever properties or powers belong either to "matter" or to "mind,"
were originally conferred on them, respectively, at the time of their
creation by the will of God; and, _secondly_, that by the same will,
these properties and powers are continually sustained, governed, and
controlled. These two positions are held by all enlightened Theists, and
are abundantly sufficient, if proved, to vindicate their doctrine
against every assault; but we think it unwarrantable and dangerous to go
further, and to ascribe, on the strength of mere gratuitous assumptions,
all the activity, motion, and change which occur in the universe to
created spirits or immaterial causes. These assumptions are extremely
different from the common-sense notion