hings, doth uphold,
direct, dispose, and govern, all creatures, actions, and things, from
the greatest even to the least, by His most wise and holy Providence;"
that "by the same Providence, He ordereth all things to fall out
_according to the nature of second causes_, either necessarily, freely,
or contingently;" and that "God in His ordinary Providence maketh use of
means, yet is free to work without, above, and against them at His
pleasure."[188]

"Natural laws" and "second causes" are thus established by experience,
and explicitly recognized in Scripture. It is necessary, however,
especially with reference to certain modern speculations, to
discriminate between the two; and to show that while they are closely
related and equally legitimate objects of philosophical inquiry, they
are nevertheless radically different, as well as easily distinguishable,
from each other. It is the favorite doctrine of the Positive school in
France that the knowledge of "causes" is utterly interdicted to man, and
that the only science to which he should aspire consists exclusively in
the knowledge of "phenomena," and their cooerdination under "general
laws." M. Comte explicitly avows this doctrine, and Mr. Mill and Mr.
Lewes give it their implied sanction.[189] According to their theory,
all Science is limited to "the laws of the coexistence and succession of
phenomena," and "causes" are not only unknown, but incapable of being
known. And to such an extent is this doctrine carried that M. Comte
anticipates the possible ultimate reduction of _all_ "phenomena" to
_one_ all-comprehensive, all-pervading "law," as the highest perfection
of Science and the decisive extinction of Religion; while Mr. Mill,
doubtful of this being possible, thinks it conceivable, at least, that
there may be worlds, different from our own, in which events occur
_without causes_ of any kind, and even without any _fixed law_.

In regard to this theory it might well be asked, how it comes to pass
that human language, which is the natural exponent of human thought,
should contain, in every one of its multifarious dialects, so many
expressions which denote or imply "causation," if it be true that all
knowledge of causes is utterly inaccessible to the human faculties? Nay,
why is it that the axiom of causation needs only to be announced to
command the immediate assent of the whole human race?

It will be found, we believe, that even in the case of those who
contend for