that are purely physical,--there are intelligent beings, belonging both
to the visible and invisible worlds, who may be employed, for ought we
know to the contrary, as "ministers in fulfilling His will," and whose
agency may, without any miraculous interference with the established
order of Nature, bring about important practical results, just as man's
own agency is admitted to have the power of arranging, modifying, and
directing the elements of Nature, while it has no power to suspend or
reverse any "natural law." And if God is ordinarily pleased to make use
of means, why should it be thought incredible that He may make use of
the ministry of intelligent beings, whether they be men or angels, for
the accomplishment of His designs? But on the second supposition,--that
while He generally makes use of means in the ordinary course of His
Providence, He reserves the liberty and the power of interposing
directly and immediately when He sees cause,--the doctrine of a special
Providence, including every interposition, natural or supernatural, is
at once established; and we cannot see how Mr. Combe, as a professed
believer in Revelation, which must of course be regarded as a
supernatural effect of "Divine influence," can consistently deny God's
direct and immediate agency in Providence, since he is compelled to
admit it at least on _two_ great occasions, namely, the Creation of the
world, and the promulgation of His revealed will.

In regard, again, to the second capital defect or error of his system,
it may be conclusively shown that he confounds, or fails at least duly
to discriminate, two things which are radically different, when he
speaks as if the "physical and organic laws" of Nature had the same
_authority_, and imposed the same obligations, as the "moral laws" of
Conscience and Revelation, and as if the breach or neglect of the former
were _punishable_, in the same sense, and for the same reason, as the
transgression of the latter.

The declared object of his treatise is twofold: first, to illustrate the
relation subsisting between the "natural laws" and the "constitution of
man;" and, secondly, to prove the _independent operation_ of these laws,
as _a key to the explanation of the Divine government_. In illustrating
the relation between the "natural laws" and the "constitution of man,"
he attempts to show that the natural laws require obedience not less
than the moral, and that they inflict punishment on disobedience